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I arrogance? Or does tht he arrogance 01 
Congress? 
Shortly after Dickei luted ' 35017 a 
her of Supreme Court watchers criticized the Court for its "jul 
;ance9' in peremptorily rejecting Congress' test for the admissi 
ssions. The test, pointed out the critics, had bcen adopted by 
extensive hearings and debate about Miranda's adverse impact on 
enforcement. 
The Dicker :tory of § 
However, in an article published six weeks before the decision in ClLnLk3ul 
"Can (Did) Congress 'Overrule' Miranda?" 85 Cornell Law Review 8833 ( 
Professor Yale Kamisar discussed the legislative history of § 3501 at length 
concluded, in eflect, that Congress - not the Supreme Court - should be 
awarded the prize for c ?. According to Kamisar, proponents of § 3501 
were detennined to "01 Miranda by simple legislation; they hoped to 
bypass the prescribed process jor amending the Constitution and to persuade the 
Extracts from the article appear here with 
iew. (Experts representing the many sides o 
lool in November to ponder "Corqession La1 
ulckerson:, bee story on page 34.) 
Supreme Court. Third, it overturned 
Mallo~y. . . Fourth, it abolished the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts to review 
state convictions in habeas corpw 
proceedings. Fifth, it stripped away the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and all 
other [federal] courts to overturn a state 
court's finding that a confession was 
voluntary or a . . . trial court3 holding that 
an eye-witness identification was 
admissible. 
"Nothing quite so irregular had ever 
been aimed at the Supreme Court by 
Congress before. It was essentially an 
attempt to use a statute to reverse a string of 
Supreme Court decisions, most of which 
had been interpretations of the 
Constitution. . . . The supporters of Title I1 
made little effort to disguise their intent to 
blackjack the Court into c h a n p g  its 
course. In private, Senator McClellan called 
it 'my petition for a rehearing' on Miranda 
. . . . [As the Senate Judiciary Committee] 
e-xplained, 'the Miranda decision itself was 
by a bare majority of one, and with 
increasing frequency the Supreme Court 
has reversed itself. The committee feels that 
As Professor Otis Stephens noted in "The Section 3501 and other provisions of by the time the issue of constitutionality 
Supreme Court and Confessions of Guilt" Title I1 of the Omnibus Crime Control and would reach the Supreme Court, the 
(1973), his book-length study of the Safe Streets Act of 1968 were written and probability rather is that the legslation 
Suprcme Court and confessions: "In the debated against this general background. As would be upheld.' 
aftermath of Miranda v. Aeona ,  an array of Fred Graham. then the Supreme Court "Those were the sentiments of a 
Supreme Court critics, in and out of correspondent for the Netv York Times, committee that was dominated by Southern 
Congress, insisted on linking the new observed, "[wlhen Title I1 burst from the senators who had been nursing hurt 
interrogation requirements with what they relative obscurity of the Senate Judiciary feelings over the school desegregation 
described as an unparalleled national crisis Committee onto the Senate floor in April of decision of 1954 and who wanted to take it 
in crime control and law enforcement." In 1968 it was immediately seen as a bald out on the Supreme Court o17er crime." 
riewspaper editorials, as well as in legslative congressional attempt to rap the Supreme Graham characterized Title I1 as "a piece 
halls. Miranda was charged with wreaking Court's knuckles over crime. Its provisions of dubious statesmanship designed more to 
havoc and the Warren Court accused of read like a cataloLgue of familiar pevances chastise the Supreme Court than to 
< L  L 
coddling criminals,' 'handcuffing police,' against the Warren Court: improve the law.'' Another close observer of 
:'nd otherwise undermining 'law and order' "First, it purported to reverse Miranda . . the debate over Title 11, Professor Robert 
at  the very time when police faced their . [in] federal trials. . . . Second, it included Burt, put it more strongly: "Title 11 was, to 
mhst perilous and overwhelming the similar effort to overrule United States v an important degree, a gesture of defiance 
cllallenge." Wade, a 1967 case that established the right at a Court that protected criminals and 
to counsel at pretrial lineups. . . . These two Communists, and attacked traditional 
sections applied only to federal courts, but religous, political, and social institutions.'' 
it was assumed that state legislatures would 
pass similar laws if these were to get by the 
- 
During the debates on Title 11, Senator 
John McClellan told his colleagues that "the 
tone is set at the top" and that "the 
Supreme Court has set a low tone in law 
enforcement." As already noted. Senator 
McClellan chaired the Senate subcommittee 
hearings on Title I1 and drafted some of the 
Crime Bill provisions. He also managed the 
Judiciary Committee's bill. Moreo\~er, 
McClellan dominated both the subcommittee 
hearings and the debates on the Senate 
floor. One might say that as far as the 
congressional battle over Title I1 was 
concerned, Senator McClellan "set the tone 
at the top," and he set it very low indeed. 
The depth of his anger at the Court and the 
intensity of his emotion-charged language is 
evident in many of his statements, as the 
following examples demonstrate: 
[The] tone is set at the top. The Supreme 
Court has set a low tone in law 
enforcement, and we are reaping the 
whirlwind today. Look at [the crime 
graph] chart. Look at it and weep for 
your country Crime spiraling upward 
and upward and upward. Apparently 
nobody is willing to put on the brakes. I 
say to my colleagues today that the 
Senate has the opportunity - and the 
hour of decision is fast approaching. . . . 
[If] this confessions provision is 
defeated, the law-breaker will be the 
beneficiary, and he will be further 
encouraged and reassured that he can 
continue a life of crime and depredations 
profitably with impunity and without 
punishment. . . . [If Title I1 is defeated] 
every gangster and overlord of the 
underworld; . . . every murderer, rapist, 
robber . . . will have cause to rejoice and 
celebrate. 
Whereas, if it is defeated, the safety of 
decent people will be placed in greater 
jeopardy and every innocent, law- 
abiding . . . citizen in this land will have 
cause to weep and despair. 
Today, why should a policeman go out 
and risk his life to catch a known 
murderer or criminal who is armed with 
a gun, when the Supreme Court will 
find some small technicality . . . to find a 
way to turn that murderer or criminal 
loose and then, [in its decisions], attack 
the officer who risked his life and reflect 
upon his inteLgtity, by inferring that we 
cannot t111st a policeman to do right. . . . 
That is their attitude. 
Under the Court's logic in the Miranda 
case, the day may come when a parent 
cannot ask his child about any harm the 
child has committed upon his mother 
without the parent giving him a warning 
that anything the child says may be used 
against him. Should fathers and mothers 
be required [to gve the Miranda 
warnings] before they ask a child about 
an act that may be criminal. . . [?I  
[TI he spiraling rate of crime that now 
plagues our nation and endangers our 
internal security will continue unabated 
- even worsen - so long as this rigid 
and arbitrary prohibition against the 
admission into evidence of voluntary 
confessions by criminals is imposed on 
the processes of justice. As chosen 
representatives of our people we have a 
duty to do something about it." 
It was not the Constitution that changed. 
It was five members of the Court [in 
Miranda] who undertook to change the 
Constitution. . . . 
This is nothing less than an usurpation 
by the Court of the power to amend the 
Constitution. That power is not reposed 
in the Court by the Constitution. 
I t  is that usurpation of power and its 
exercise that we are truly trylng to 
correct. 
I wholeheartedly agree that [changes in 
the Constitution should be made by 
constitutional amendment]. We are here 
protesting and trylng to rectify 5-4 Court 
decisions which have had the effect of 
amending the Constitution - a power 
the Supreme Court does not have under 
the Constitution. 
Throughout the subcommittee hearings 
and the debates on the Senate floor, Senator 
Sam Enrin proved to be McClellanS chief 
lieutenant. He, too, had drafted some of the 
provisions contained in the Judiciary 
Committee's Crime Bill. As we have seen, at 
first Ervin had balked at attempting to 
overturn Miranda by legslation. But then 
Enin threw himself into the battle with 
considerable gusto: 
If you believe that the people of the 
United States should be niled by a 
judicial oligarchy con~posed of five 
Supreme Court justices rather than by 
the Constitution of the United States, 
you ought to vote against Title 11. If you 
believe that self-confessed murderers, 
rapists, robbers, arsonists, burglars, and 
thieves ought to go unpunished, you 
ought to vote against Title 11. . . . Ru. l f  
you believe as the senator from North 
Carolina believes, that enough has been 
done for those who murder and rape 
and rob, and that something ought to be 
done for those who do not wish to be 
murdered or raped or robbed, then you 
should vote for Title 11. 
When the Supreme Court takes the 
words of the Constitution and attribute; 
to them a meaning which allorvs self- 
confessed murderers and rapists and 
arsonists . . . to go free of justice, then I 
think it is time for us to do something 
because we are the only power on earth 
which can do anything to protect 
American people against decisions like 
this, decisions which constitute a 
usurpation of power denied to the 
majority of the Supreme Court by the 
very instrument they profess to interpret. 
All I can say is that the majority of the 
Supreme Court, in the Miranda case, . . . 
evidently wedded themselves to the 
strange theory that no man should be 
allowed to confess his guilt, even though 
the Bible says, even though psychiatnsts 
assert, and even though those interested 
in the rehabilitation of prisoners declare 
than an honest 'confession is good for 
the soul.' Hence, they invented rules in 
the Mirnnda case to keep people from 
confessing their crimes and sins. The 
wisest of men could not have devised 
more efficacious rules to accomplish this 
object had he pondered the question a 
thousand years. 
As the Senate debate on the Crime Bill 
intensified, Republican Presidential 
Candidate kchard M. Nixon issued his 
position paper on crime, "Toward Freedoln 
from Fear." This paper demonstrated that 
when it came to using the Court as a 
scapegoat for the crime and violence that 
beset the nation, Mr. Nixon yielded neitll~r 
to Senate McClellan nor Senator Ervin nor 
/ 
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,IT-I!~ other uemocrat~c politician. Nixon 
urSed Congress to pass the bill overturning 
~<ioFcdo and Mil-anda and restoring the 
~,~~luntariness t t as a way to "redress the 
Imbalance" caused by these decisions - a 
to offset the blow suffered by "the 
peace forces in our society" 
Said Nison in "Toward Freedom from 
Fcar": "In the last seven years while the 
population of this country was rising some 
10 percent, crime in the United States rose 
n sraglering 88 percent. . . . 
"[A] contributing cause of this staggering 
increase is that street crime is a more 
lucrative and less risky occupation than it 
has ever been in the past. Only one of eight 
major crimes committed now results in 
arrest, prosecution, conviction, and 
punishment - and a 12 percent chance of 
punishment is not adequate to deter a man 
bent on a career in crime. Among the 
contributing factors to the small figure are 
the decisions of a majority of one of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
[The "only one-in-eight crimes results in 
conviction" statistic is especially jolting - 
but highly misleading, as I noted in "How 
to Use, Abuse - and Fight Back With - 
Cnme Statistics," 25 Oklahoma h u  Review 
251-52 (1972). Even if the conviction rate 
(the percentage of those held for 
prosecution who are found guilty) were 100 
percent, only one reported crime in s i .  
would result in a conviction, because only 
one reported crime in six leads to a criminal 
prosecution. The great bulk of reported 
crimes never lead to an arrest.] 
"The Miranda and Escobedo decisions of 
the high court have had the effect of 
seriously ham stringng [sic] the peace 
forces in our society and strengthening the 
criminal forces. 
"From the point of view of the peace 
forces, the cumulative effect [of] these 
decisions has been to very nearly nlle out 
the 'confession' as an effective and major 
tool in prosecution and law enforcement. . . . 
"From the point of view of the criminal 
forces, the cumulative impact of these 
decisions has been to set free patently guilty 
individuals on the basis of legal 
technicalities. 
"The tragc lesson of guilty men walking 
free from hundreds of courtrooms across 
the country has not been lost on the 
criminal community . . . 
"The balance must be shifted back 
toward the peace forces in our society and a 
requisite step is to redress the imbalance 
created by these specific decisions. I urould 
thus urge Congress to enact proposed 
legislation that - dealing with both 
Mira?zda and Escobedo - would leave it to 
the judge and the jury to determine both 
the voluntariness and the validity of any 
confession. . . . 
"[I] think [the Warren Court's criminal 
procedure decisions] point up a genuine 
need - a need for future presidents to 
include in their appointments to the United 
States Supreme Court men who are 
thoroughly experienced and versed in the 
criminal laws of the land." 
Senator Karl Mundt, who asked and 
obtained unanimous consent to print 
Nixon's position paper in the Cor~gressional 
Record, noted that "[m]uch of what the 
former Vice President discusses in his 
position paper is before us in the form of' 
the Crime Bill. So Senator McClellan would 
have had his colleagues believe. One close 
obsenrer of the Senate debate opined that 
"McClellan's most eminent supporter turned 
out to be Rchard Nixon." 
During the debate on the Senate floor, 
Senators Enin and McClellan repeatedly 
referred to the transcript of the McClellan 
subcommittee hearings for o\renvhelming 
evidence of the heavy blow the Warren 
Court's confession nllings had dealt law 
enforcement and the strong need to right 
the situation by overturning the n~lings. 
Unfortunately, when it came to open- 
mindedness and fair play senator 
McClellan's subcommittee hearings left a 
1 
I) uring the debate on the 
Senate floor, Senators Ervin 
and McClellan repeatedly 
referred to the transcript of 
the McClellan subcommittee 
hearings for overwhelming 
evidence of the heavy blow the 
Warren Court's confession 
rulings had dealt law 
enforcement and the s 
need to right the situation by 
overturning the rulings. 
Unfortunately, when it came to 
open-mindedness and fair 
play, Senator McClellanTs 
subcommittee hearings left a 
great dei ! desired. 
1 
great deal to be desired. As one close 
student of Title I1 pointed out, "the familiar 
claims of a direct connection between the I 
enlargement of procedural requirements 
and a rising crime rate were repeated by a 
parade of districc attorneys, police chiefs, 
and other representatives of what might be 
called the 'law enforcement lobby"' Senator 
McClellan himself noted (with evident 
pride) that the record of his subcommittee 
hearings "contains letters from 122 chiefs of 
police in 37 states." 
When Senator Joseph Tydings, who led 
the opposition to Title I1 in the Senate, 
charged that not a single constitutional law 
professor or criminal law professor had 
been gven an opportunity to testify before 
Senator McClellan's subcommittee on the 
wisdom or constitutionality of this 
proposal, McClellan did not deny it. He 
responded simply that every member of the 
Senate had been invited to testify and that a 
person from Tydings' own state has also 
testified (the president of the Maryland 
District Attorneys Association). 
The conspicuous absence of any law 
professors at the subcommittee hearings 
(or any defense lawyers or public defenders 
for that matter) could hardly be attributed 
to a lack of interest by those in academia. 
When asked by Senator Tydings to state 
their views on the desirability of § 3501 
and other anti-Court provisions and on the 
power of Congress to enact them, 212 law 
professors (including 24 law school deans) 
from 43 law schools had responded. Most 
attacked the constitutionality of the 
anti-Miranda provision; not a single one 
defended it. 
Almost all of the law enforcement 
officials who appeared before the Senate 
subcommittee talked about both the need 
for and the constitutionality of Title IT, thus 
telling McClellan, Enfin, and their allies 
what they wanted, and expected, to hear. 
But the testimony of the most eminent 
witness to appear before the subcommittee, 
J. Edward Lumbard, chief judge of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and 
chairman of the ABA special Committee on 
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 
probably surprised and disappointed 
proponents of Title 11. 
A year earlier, Judge Lumbard had 
voiced his unhappiness with the approach 
the Supreme Court had taken in Escobedo. 
And during his appearance before the 
subcommittee he made it clear he was not 
enamored of Miranda. At one point he 
agreed that the self-incrimination clause 
would seem to have no bearing whatever 
on the admissibility of a confession that 
satisfied the traditional pre-Miranda 
voluntariness test (calling this his "o\m 
personal view"). At another point, he agreed 
that there is "no better evidence" of a 
person's guilt that his own voluntary 
confession. Nevertheless, Judge Lumbard 
balked at overturning Miranda by 
legslation. 
He told the subcommittee that if 
Congress were unhappy with Mi randa 
because it unduly hampered police efforts 
to apprehend criminals "the only way to 
correct the situation would be by 
amendment to the Constitution . . . we 
must apply the Constitution and the law as 
the Supreme Court has interpreted them." 
When asked specifically whether the much- 
quoted language in Miranda "encourag[ing] 
Congress and the States to consider their 
laudable search for increasingly effective 
ways of protecting the rights of the 
individual while promoting efficient 
enforcement of our law" "opens the door 
for legslation [such as Title TI] which 
would pennit our avoiding the 
constitutional amendment process," Judge 
Lumbard answered, "No; I don't think it 
permits you to do that." He added that 
Congress could not enact legslation that 
failed to do everything the Court said had 
to be done "[u]nless you can find some 
suitable substitute for the requirements laid 
down by the Supreme Court." 
At this point, Senator McClellan made it 
plain that he was only interested in 
abolishing Miranda, not in finding a 
"suitable substitute" for it. He also left litile 
doubt that he was well aware that 
abolishing Miranda by legslation would be 
a risky venture. Consider the following 
exchange: 
Senator McClellan: ". . . If they [a 
majority of the justices] base the Miranda 
decision strictly on constitutional issues, I 
don't understand how you could write a 
statute that did not do everything the Court 
has said must be done. And if you do that, 
you destroy everything that you seek to 
attain anyhow." 
Judge Lumbard: "Unless you can find 
some suitable substitute for the 
requirements laid down by the Supreme 
Court. . . ." 
Senator McClellan: "They [a majority nf 
the justices] wouldn't accept it as suitahlc 
unless it accomplished the destruction t t ln t  
their decision does. They say it is based on 
the Constitution. I don't know how you cnn 
do it. They say you have got to do these 
things. Well, how can you do less if the 
Constitution requires that this be donel" 
In the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary's report recommending that 
Title I1 be enacted into law, the commillec 
maintained that "[tlhe Supreme Court ilscif 
suggests" that Congress is free to overturn 
Miranda by statute and that Congress 
should accept this invitation because it  "is 
better able to cope with the problem of 
confessions than is the Court." With one 
esception, the committee relied only on law 
enforcement officials and several U.S. 
senators who had testified before the 
subcommittee. The one exception was 
Judge Lumbard, even though, as we have 
seen, he appeared to have said just the 
opposite of what the committee wished to 
hear. How did this remarkable turn of 
events come about? 
The Judiciary Committee report took 
Judge Lumbard's testimony out of contest. 
The report quotes the judge as follows: 
"In my opinion, it is most important the 
Congress should take some action in the 
important areas I have discussed. The 
legslative process permits a wide variety of 
views to be screened and testimony can be 
taken from those who know the facts and 
those who bear the responsibility for law 
enforcement. 
"The legslative process is far better 
calculated to set standards and rules by 
statute than is the process of announcins 
principles through court decisions in 
particular cases where the facts are limited. 
The legislative process is better adapted to 
seeing the situation in all its aspects and 
establishing a system and rules which can 
govern a multitude of different cases." 
This testimony sounds as if Judge 
Lumbard was cheering on the Congress in 
its efforts to abolish Miranda by legslation, 
but only because the Judiciary Committee 
omitted both what the judge had told thc 
subcommittee earlier and what he was to 
tell it later. Judge Lumbard had pointed out 
earlier that the Miranda Court had not dcdt 
urlth certain situations, such as what rulci, 
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:~n): should apply when the police are 
q~~c'tinning someone not in custody, e.g., 
Inr,-r\iewing a person in his own home 
\\7111 other family members present. He told 
Congress it should "feel free to state a 
policy and lay down appropriate rules 
rt-R:irding the admission of evidence" in 
thcic situations. These were "the important 
arcas" Judge Lumbard was talking about in 
tllc portion of his testimony quoted by the 
Judiciary Committee (areas for which the 
h,liranda opinion had not provided definite 
snswers) when he testified he thought it 
uniost important that the Congress should 
take some action in the important areas I 
have discussed. " 
If there were any doubts about what 
Judge Lumbard meant in the testimony 
quoted by the Committee Report, he 
resolved them later when responding to a 
question from Senator Hugh Scott: 
"No; I don't think [the language 
encouragng the Congress to establish other 
procedures which are equally effective in 
app"ing suspects of their rights] permits 
you tc do that [overturn Miranda without 
invoking the constitutional amendment 
process], but there certainly is a wide area 
which obviously the Court had not covered 
in its opinion in the Miranda cases, not only 
the matter of questioning before a person is 
in custody, but then the manner in which 
the defendant or suspect is handled while 
he is in custody, the way in which the 
wrning is gven, the record that is made, 
the presence of other people . . . these are 
oh~iously the nest questions that are going 
to be raised in contested cases. 
"I think that this whole area is open to 
the Congress and . . . it would be most 
helpful and most important that Congress 
should attempt to deal with these areas, and 
lay down the rules and the standards so far 
as federal cases are concerned." 
The Judiciary Committee report was 
also less than honest in its treatment of the 
testimony of another federal judge who 
appeared at the subcommittee hearings: 
Judge Alexander Holtzoff, a federal district 
judge for the District of Columbia. The 
committee assured the full Senate that 
Judge Holtzoff "sees no constitutional bar to 
congressional abrogation of the Mallory 
rule," quoting from his testimony. But when 
it discussed Congress' freedom to enact 
legslation overturning Escobedo and 
Miranda, the committee omitted any 
reference to Judge Holtzoff's testimony, no 
doubt because this time he told the 
subcommittee that there was a 
constitutional bar to congressional action: 
"Of course, the Escobedo and the 
Miranda cases are in a different class [than 
Malloly] in one important respect. They are 
based on the Constitution. They hold that 
the Constitution requires these warnings. 
Therefore, it would take a constitutional 
amendment, unless the Supreme Court 
overmles itself, whereas, the h4a l lo~  rule 
being purely a procedural rule, can be 
changed by legslation." 
Those asked to testik at the Senate 
subcommittee hearings on the Crime Bill 
were those whose testimony was espected 
to advance the cause of the subcommittee's 
chairman, Senator John McClellan. As the 
Senate Judiciary Committee Report's 
treatment of testimony of Judges Holtzoff 
and Lumbard well illustrates, on those rare 
occasions when a witness said something 
that disappointed Senator h4cClellan, 
that testimony was misrepresented 
or simply ignored. 
The legslative history of 5 3501 makes 
it hard to take seriously any argument that 
courts should defer to Congress' superior 
fact-finding capacity On this occasion at 
least, the much vaunted superior fact- 
finding capacity of Congress was little in 
evidence. The le@slative history of 5 3501 
also greatly impairs, if it does not destroy, 
other arguments that proponents of the 
provision have made - that 5 3501 takes 
into account the Miranda warnings or 
recognizes the central holding of Mil-anda or 
represents a "blend" of the old \roluntariness 
test and the new Miranda decision. The last 
thing congressional proponents of 5 3501 
wanted to do was to pay respect to 
Miranda. They were determined to bur)? 
Mil-an&, not to recognize it. 
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